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ON ELIGIBILITY BY THE DE BORDA VOTING RULES
V. YU. KISELEV
Abstract. We show that a necessary condition for eligibility of a candidate by the
set of de Borda’s voting rules in [H. Moulin (1988) Axioms of cooperative decision
making] is not sufficient and we obtain some criterion for eligibility. Let r(ai) be the
score vector of a candidate ai, R be the set of all vectors r(ai), and let R
′ be the
Pareto boundary of the convex hull convR. Then there is a scoring s such that a
candidate a wins with respect to the de Borda voting rule βs if and only if r(a) ∈ R
′.
Introduction. Suppose the set A of candidates and the profile u of the voters’ prefer-
ences are fixed. Let s be a system of scores and βs be the de Borda rule assigned to s.
Further, let βs(u) ⊂ A be the set of winners w.r.t. this rule. A candidate a ∈ A is eligi-
ble w.r.t. the set of de Borda’s rules βs if there is a scoring s such that a ∈ βs(u). The
book [1] suggests the following necessary condition for eligibility of a given candidate a
w.r.t. the set of de Borda’s rules: a winner a has the score vector r(a) that belongs
to the Pareto boundary of the set R = {r(aj), aj ∈ A}; see pages 2 – 3 for rigorous
definitions.
Unfortunately, the condition in this formulation is not sufficient. On page 5 we give
a counter-example using the profile u defined in Eq. (1).
In Theorems 2 and 3 below we prove some version of the eligibility criterion and so
we give a complete solution for a problem from [1, p. 249]. The difference between
the condition in our criterion and the necessary condition from [1] is that the Pareto
boundary of the convex hull convR must be used instead of the Pareto boundary of
the set R itself, here R is the set of all score vectors.
1. Definitions
1.1. Profiles. Let P1, . . . , Pn be electors (or voters) and A = {a1; . . . ; ap} be the set
of candidates in some elections. Suppose that every elector Pi has an opinion about
each candidate such that the candidates are arranged by the strict order >i : the first
candidate in this rearrangement is the most favourable for Pi, etc. This strict linear
order >i on A is called the preference of the elector Pi and is denoted by ui. The
order ui is given by the sequence
aj1 >i aj2 >i . . . >i ajp,
where J = (j1; j2; . . . ; jp) is a rearrangement of (1; 2; . . . ; p); generally, J depends on
the elector Pi.
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In what follows, we write down the elements of the preferences ui in columns and
thus we compose the matrix
u =
∣∣u1 u2 . . . un
∣∣.
This matrix is the profile of preferences of the voters. Let us denote by L(A) the
set of all strict linear orders on A. Then the profiles u are elements of the space of
preferences L = (L(A))n.
Suppose that several voters have coinciding preferences ui, and assume that the order
of electors is not important for the voting rules. Then we write down the coinciding
columns only once and indicate the respective number of electors in the upper line of
the matrix u, e. g.,
u =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2 6 7 1
a b c c
b a a b
c c b a
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (1)
Notation (1) means that p = 3, n = 16, and A = {a; b; c} is the set of candidates;
two electors have the preference a >i b >i c (i = 1, 2), six electors have the preference
b >i a >i c (i = 3, . . . , 8), seven electors have the preference c >i a >i b (i = 9, . . . , 15),
and the 16th elector has the preference c >16 b >16 a.
We shall use the profile defined by Eq. (1) in Example 2 on page 5 as a counter-
example to the erroneous criterion in [1].
Definition 1. Let n and p be positive integers. A voting rule ϕ is a point-to-set map1
ϕ : L → A such that ϕ(u) 6= ∅ for each profile u ∈ L of dimension n×p. The candidates
a ∈ ϕ(u) are called winners with respect to the rule ϕ and the profile u.
1.2. Generalized de Borda’s voting rules. A generalized de Borda’s voting rule is
defined by the following conditions.
Definition 2. Let s = (s0; s1; . . . ; sp−1) be a vector such that
s0 ≤ s1 ≤ · · · ≤ sk ≤ · · · ≤ sp−1 and s0 < sp−1. (2)
The vector s is a system of scores, or a scoring. Then, each candidate a ∈ A obtains s0
points for the last place in the preference of a voter, s1 points for the last but one place,
s2 points for the third place from the bottom, etc.; clearly, sp−1 points are obtained
for the top position. The points accumulated by a candidate a from all the voters are
summed, and this sum Bs(a) is called the de Borda estimate of the candidate a w.r.t.
the scoring s, or, briefly, the s-estimate for a. The de Borda voting rule βs with the
scoring s says that the candidates a ∈ A who have the maximal sum Bs(a) of points
are the winners of these elections. Note that the winner may be not unique if two or
more candidates a, b, . . . obtain equal (maximal) estimates Bs(a) = Bs(b) = . . . . We
denote by βs(u) the set of all winners with respect to the profile u.
Example 1. The standard de Borda voting rule is based on the system of scores s =
(0; 1; 2; . . . ; p− 1): a candidate obtains 0 points for the last place, 1 point for the last
but one place, etc.; a candidate obtains p−1 points for the first place. The rule suggests
that the winner has the maximal sum of points from all voters.
1A point-to-set map f : D → E maps each x ∈ D to some subset f(x) ⊂ E.
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The plurality voting rule is also a generalized de Borda’s rule. The rule corresponds
to the scoring s with s0 = 0, s1 = 0, . . . , sp−2 = 0, sp−1 = 1. Therefore the sum Bs(a)
consists of m units if a is the preferable candidate for m voters; hence the winner by
the rule βs receives the plurality in the preferences of the voters.
The antiplurality voting rule is another generalized de Borda’s rule. It corresponds
to the scoring s such that s0 = −1, s1 = 0, s2 = 0, . . . , sp−1 = 0. The candidate who
wins by the rule βs has the least number of the last places in the preferences of the
electors.
Remark 1. Let βs be a de Borda’s voting rule with the scoring s = (s0; s1; . . . ; sp−1). If a
constant d is added to each score sk, k = 0, . . . , p−1, then we get the new rule βs′ with
s′ such that s′k = sk + d. Hence all the estimates Bs(a) change to Bs′(a) = Bs(a) + nd,
that is, they acquire the addend nd, which does not depend on a candidate a. Obviously,
the sets of winners by the two rules βs and βs′ coincide: βs′(u) = βs(u) for any profile u.
Consequently, the scorings s and s′ define the same voting rule: βs′ = βs. If we set
d = −s0, then we have s
′
0
= 0. Therefore we can set s0 = 0 for the de Borda rule
assigned to any scoring s whenever that is convenient.
Definition 3. Let F ⊂ Rm be a closed set. Let f ′ ∈ F be a point such that there are
no other points f ∈ F which satisfy the following two conditions
• fj ≥ f
′
j for all j = 1, . . . , m, and
• fj0 > f
′
j0
for some j0.
The Pareto boundary F ′ ⊂ F is the subset constituted by all the points f ′.
A point f ′′ ∈ F belongs to the weak Pareto boundary F ′′ of the set F if there are no
points f ∈ F such that all coordinates of f are greater than the respective coordinates
of f ′′.
Finally, let us recall a helpful statement from the convex analysis.
Proposition 1. Let F be a bounded convex subset of Rm and F ′ be the (weak) Pareto
boundary of F . Then for any point f 0 ∈ F ′ there is a linear function ℓ(f) = d1f1 +
· · · + dmfm with positive (resp., nonnegative) coefficients dj such that ℓ achieves its
maximum on F at f 0. The converse is also true: any point f 00 ∈ F \ F ′ is not a point
of maximum on F for any linear function with positive (resp., nonnegative) coefficients.
2. Eligible and uneligible candidates
Let a profile u of the preferences be fixed. Suppose that the winners are determined
by a de Borda’s rule βs from some fixed set β of these rules, but we do not know which
particular scoring s will be used. Now we want to predict which candidates a ∈ A can
win by a rule βs ∈ β assigned to some scoring s (these candidates are eligible w.r.t.
this set of rules β) and which candidates definitely can not win for any βs ∈ β (we call
them uneligible w.r.t. this set of rules).
We claim that the set of eligible candidates can be found in two important cases (see
Theorems 2 and 3) without knowing beforehand the scoring s.
Suppose a profile u is fixed and a is a candidate. The following procedure allows
to obtain the score vector r(a) for a using the profile u. By construction, the score
vector r(a) has p − 1 components. The first component r1(a) equals the number of
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electors who regard a as the best. The second component r2(a) is equal to the number
of voters for whom a has either the first or the second place in their preferences; the
component r3(a) is equal to the number of electors having a on some of three first
places, etc. Thus we obtain the score vector r(a) = (r1(a); r2(a); . . . ; rp−1(a)) for every
candidate a ∈ A. Obviously, the components of the vector r(a) are non-decreasing:
r1(a) ≤ r2(a) ≤ · · · ≤ rp−1(a).
Also, we note that the score vector r(a) is found without knowing the scoring s.
Consider the set R ⊂ Rp−1 that consists of p score vectors r(a) for all candidates
a ∈ A. Next, find the Pareto boundary R′ of the convex hull convR of R.
Now we formulate the main result of this article. Theorem 2 contains the criterion
of eligibility of a given candidate by de Borda’s rules with strict scorings.
Theorem 2. Suppose a profile u is fixed. Consider the set β of all de Borda’s rules βs
with the strict scorings s such that
s0 < s1 < · · · < sp−1. (3)
Let a ∈ A be a candidate and r(a) be the score vector for a. Then the candidate a is
eligible w.r.t. the set of rules β if and only if r(a) ∈ R′, where R′ is the Pareto boundary
of the convex hull convR of the set R = {r(aj), aj ∈ A, j = 1 . . . p}.
Proof. According to Remark 1, we suppose that s0 = 0. Let us show that if a ∈
βs(u) with some scoring s such that inequalities (3) hold, then r(a) ∈ R
′. Let the
differences between the scores be d1 = s1 − s0 = s1, d2 = s2 − s1, d3 = s3 − s2, . . . ,
dp−1 = sp−1 − sp−2. We note that (3) implies dp−k > 0 for all k = 1, 2, . . . , p− 1.
Now we analyze the summands that contribute to the de Borda estimate Bs(a).
The candidate a has the first place in preferences of r1(a) voters and hence obtains
r1(a) · sp−1 points. Next, r2(a)− r1(a) voters put the candidate a on the second place,
therefore a obtains (r2(a)− r1(a)) · sp−2 more points. Similarly, for the kth place in the
preferences of (rk(a)− rk−1(a)) voters the candidate a obtains (rk(a)− rk−1(a)) · sp−k
points in the sum Bs(a), here k = 1, 2, . . . , p− 1. Recall that the last place results in
no points since s0 = 0.
By construction, the estimate Bs(a) is the sum of points obtained by a:
Bs(a) = r1(a)sp−1 + (r2(a)− r1(a))sp−2 + (r3(a)− r2(a))sp−3 + · · ·+
+ (rk(a)− rk−1(a))sp−k + · · ·+ (rp−1(a)− rp−2(a))s1 =
= r1(a)(sp−1 − sp−2) + r2(a)(sp−2 − sp−3) + · · ·+ rp−1s1 =
= r1(a)dp−1 + r2(a)dp−2 + · · ·+ rp−1d1 =
p−1∑
k=1
dp−krk(a). (4)
Thus we obtain the formula for the de Borda estimate with the scoring s (see [1, Ch. 9]).
For a ∈ βs(u), the sum in (4) is maximal and the vector r(a) is a point of maximum
on R for the linear function ℓ(r) =
p−1∑
k=1
dp−krk with positive coefficients dp−k. Moreover,
we note that the maximum of a linear function on the convex hull of a set equals
the maximum of the function on the set itself. Hence, according to Proposition 1, the
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maximum of the function ℓ(r) is achieved only at a point of the set R′, that is, r(a) ∈ R′
if a ∈ βs(u).
Conversely, suppose r(a) ∈ R′ ∩ R. By Proposition 1, we can find a system of
positive coefficients dp−k such that the linear function ℓ(r) with these coefficients has a
maximum on R′ (and, consequently, on R) at the point r(a). Using these coefficients,
we construct the scoring s = (s0; s1; . . . ; sp−1) by setting s0 = 0, s1 = d1, s2 = d1 + d2,
s3 = d1 + d2 + d3, . . . . Then from Eq. (4) it follows that the sum Bs(a) achieves its
maximum at a ∈ A and therefore a ∈ βs(u). 
Obviously, we can modify slightly the assumptions of Theorem 2 and consider a wider
set of de Borda’s rules, namely, the set β′ of rules βs with the scorings s that satisfy
condition (2) but may not satisfy (3). Then, using Proposition 1 again, we obtain
Theorem 3. Fix a profile u and consider the set β′ of all de Borda’s rules βs with
the scorings s that satisfy condition (2). Find the score vectors r(x) for all candidates
x ∈ A and consider the set R that consists of all vectors r(x). Let R′′ be the weak
Pareto boundary of the convex hull of R. Then any candidate a such that r(a) ∈ R′′ is
eligible w.r.t. this set of voting rules, and only these candidates are eligible.
Remark 2. Of course, the conclusions of the two theorems are not true if the set R∩R′
(or R ∩ R′′) is replaced by the Pareto boundary (or the weak Pareto boundary) of the
set R itself. (We recall that the set R ∩R′ (or R ∩R′′) consist of the vectors r(a) that
belong to the Pareto boundary (or to the weak Pareto boundary) of convR.) Indeed,
the sets R∩R′ and R∩R′′ can be more narrow than the (weak) Pareto boundary of R.2
This situation is illustrated by the following example.
Example 2 (A. V. Shapovalov, private communication). Let p = 3 and n = 16.
Consider profile (1); then we have r(a) = (2; 15), r(b) = (6; 9), r(c) = (8; 8).
✻
✲
s
s
s
0 5 10
5
10
r(b)
convR
r(c)
r(a)r2
r1
Figure 1. Three vectors r(a), r(b), r(c) and their convex hull convR
The Pareto boundary of the set R = {r(a); r(b); r(c)} contains all the three vectors
r(a), r(b), and r(c), but only r(a) and r(c) belong to the sets R′ and R′′ (see Fig. 1).
2Clearly, since R ∩ R′ is a part of the Pareto boundary of R (and R ∩ R′′ is a part of the weak
Pareto boundary of R), the condition of [1] is necessary. Namely, any winner a by some rule βs has
the (weak) Pareto optimal (i. e., belonging to the (weak) Pareto boundary of R) score vector r(a).
But this condition is not sufficient: not every candidate a having the (weak) Pareto optimal score
vector r(a) can win by some voting rule βs.
6 V. YU. KISELEV
Hence only a and c can be the winners by some of the generalized de Borda rules if
we have profile (1). The vector r(b) is Pareto optimal, but none of the linear functions
ℓ(r1; r2) = d2r1 + d1r2 with positive or nonnegative coefficients d1 and d2 achieves its
maximum on R at the point r(b). Therefore the candidate b is uneligible neither w.r.t.
the set β nor w.r.t. the set β′: there is no rule βs such that b is a winner.
The author thanks Prof. A. V. Shapovalov (KTH, Stockholm) for illuminating dis-
cussions and Prof. H. Moulin (Rice University, Houston, Texas) for favourable attention
to the article and the approval of its results.
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